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Write a midterm essay (maximum of 1500 words) that addresses **ONE** of the following essay prompts. Due Wednesday 7th November 2018 by 12pm (mid-day).

1. Explain Frege's function-argument analysis of a complex expression such as "Caesar conquered Gaul" and "the capital of Scotland" and how those relate to Frege's analysis of mathematical expressions such as " $2+2=4$ " and " $3+5$ ", respectively. How does Frege extend the function-argument analysis to sentences such as "Someone is hungry" and "Everyone is hungry"? How does this analysis support Frege's claim that "The ontological proof of God's existence suffers from the fallacy of treating existence as a first-level concept"? Do you think that all complex expressions avail themselves to a function-argument analysis?

2. Frege asks whether identity is a relation between objects, or between names of objects. What is the difference and what does Frege think identity is a relation between? Explain in detail Frege's famous "Morning Star"/"Evening Star" example. What is it suppose to show? When do expressions '*a*' and '*b*' have different senses? What, then, is the general connection between a sign, its sense, and its referent? Explain Frege's telescope analogy, and how it is suppose to clarify what a sense is? Do you agree with Frege that we need to posit senses to account for the difference in cognitive significance of co-referential terms?

3. How would Frege treat a sentence like "The Queen of England is hungry"? And how is Russell's 1905 treatment from "On denoting" fundamentally different from Frege's? Provide, in detail, Russell's analysis of sentences of the form "The *F* is *G*", and explain how this relates to his analysis of sentences of the form "All *F* are *G*", "No *F* are *G*", and "Some *F* are *G*". Why does Russell think his view is an advance over Frege's? Do you think that Russell's view is preferable to Frege's?

4. According to Leibniz's law of substitution if ' $a = b$ ' is true, then ' $a$  is *F*' is true just in case ' $b$  is *F*' is true. Thus from (i) and (ii) it seems that (iii) must follow:

- i. Sam believes that the Morning Star has a moon
- ii. The Morning Star = The Evening Star
- iii. Sam believes that the Evening Star has a moon

But since, we might suppose, although Sam says 'yes' when we ask her if the Morning Star has a moon, she says 'no' when we ask her if the Evening Star has a moon, it seems that (i) and (ii) don't entail (iii). Explain this puzzle in detail. How does Frege address this puzzle? How does Russell address it? Which solution is better?

5. Explain Russell's distinction between *primary* and *secondary* occurrence in "On denoting", and explain the notion of scope distinctions more generally, e.g. in sentences such as "Every philosopher admires some logician" or "Every student did not pass the exam"—or the "touchy" yacht owner's utterance. Explain why "The King of France is bald or The King of France is not bald" is a threat to the Law of Excluded Middle, and why Russell thinks Frege's view ends up violating the Law of Excluded Middle. How does Russell employ the notion of scope to address this puzzle? Do you think that Russell's solution is successful? Is it preferable to Frege's story?

6. Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* begins with a long quote from Augustine's *Confessions*. How does the view described in this quote relate to the views on language endorsed by Frege, Russell, and early Wittgenstein? Explain later Wittgenstein's critique (in the *Philosophical Investigations*) of the picture theory of language, and explain, with examples, Wittgenstein's alternative approach to meaning. Is Wittgenstein's view of language better than Frege's and Russell's? If so, why?